From Tehran to Tel Aviv: Escalation, Resilience, and the Fragile Road to Diplomacy

From Tehran to Tel Aviv: Escalation, Resilience, and the Fragile Road to Diplomacy

By Elijah J. Magnier

As the Israel–Iran confrontation intensifies into a full-scale war, Tehran is no longer merely absorbing attacks—it is asserting itself as a strategic force capable of inflicting sustained and multidimensional damage. Through a calibrated combination of ballistic, hypersonic, and drone-based assaults, alongside the continuous dismantling of clandestine intelligence networks, Iran is not only retaliating against Israel but shaping the battlefield on its own terms. The message to Washington is unmistakable: any U.S. decision to formally enter the war will carry enormous consequences.

Unlike Israel, the United States maintains a vast network of military bases encircling Iran—in Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Syria—all well within range of Iran’s expanding missile arsenal. The recent integration of hypersonic capabilities into Iran’s arsenal has amplified these vulnerabilities, transforming the U.S. footprint from a deterrent force into a potential liability in the event of escalation.

Amid this precarious landscape, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is scheduled to travel to Switzerland for urgent consultations with European counterparts in an effort to de-escalate the crisis. However, in response to a U.S. diplomatic initiative—spearheaded by presidential envoy Steve Witkoff—Tehran has drawn a clear red line: no negotiations on nuclear issues will take place while Iranian territory remains under military attack.

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For Tehran, the destruction of its nuclear facilities—however significant—is not tantamount to the end of its nuclear programme. Iran’s scientific and technical expertise is dispersed, resilient, and deeply institutionalised. The Islamic Republic has made it clear that it can rebuild its enrichment and missile capabilities with greater sophistication, shaped by wartime experience and new security protocols. Even the much-vaunted U.S. GBU-57 “bunker buster” bomb, designed to target fortified installations like Fordo, may not guarantee total destruction. But even if it did, it would not neutralise Iran’s long-term capabilities and nuclear knowledge.

This war has reinforced a critical strategic lesson for Tehran: it cannot rely on imported uranium or externally mediated agreements to preserve its national security. The earlier U.S. proposal for Iran to purchase enriched uranium on the open market is now perceived as untenable. Instead, Tehran views domestic enrichment as the only viable—and negotiable—platform going forward. The breakdown of trust, fuelled by Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 JCPOA and Israel’s ongoing military aggression in coordination with Washington, has only hardened Iran’s resolve to fortify its sovereign control over its nuclear future.

Meanwhile, Israel finds itself increasingly overextended—militarily, economically, and